

Box 33
Strategic
Balance V

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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On 12 February 1962, the East-West relations were still in a state of tension. The East-West relations are not really new. On 12 February 1962, the press of the United States has been concerned for a long time of the year.

E. Questions: How many are there? ... reported to the ... ?

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL L. V. LIGER Force of the **MARU** countries over
the **MARU** portion of the **MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT**

14-00000 OFFICE OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Estimate of European NATO Build-up Over the Next Year. NATO for a short term build-up toward an anticipated crisis over Berlin, many of the Reference is made to your 10-February telephone request for an informal NATO Affairs (European Region) OASD/ISA summary (one or two NATO pages) of the above subject, covering the following: the extent of providing a higher plateau of forces. That is, how have our European NATO Allies responded to the Berlin crisis? Consequently, the former paragraph is also being used in leveling the playing field.

b. What would be the effect on force build-up by our European NATO Allies during the next year if, during that period of time, there were no change in the present state of affairs, i.e., no worsening or relaxation of the Berlin crisis? How do you think we should plan and organize the costs, eleven and twelfth with short term political actions such as administrative reduction on the basis of b above, how would NATO one year from now on existing stand with respect to the Soviet Bloc, i.e., better off, worse off, or stayed the same? (instad by 1 April 1962), the high level of levels in the FRO should be maintained. This program is dependent on agreement with the U.S. for

2- The summary you requested is attached as an enclosure. In this connection, you may wish to contact Mr. Bromley Smith in regard to information on Soviet Bloc and NATO build-up furnished him by memoranda dated 29 December 1961 and 14 January 1962.

by returning the divisions to the divisions of the Army in the Fall of 1961. If the Algerian problem is settled in the coming year, our French will probably return two more divisions to the 1st Army and we will be asked about returning all three divisions. The 15th DIVISION will have three divisions on the continent, reorganized and increased to reinforce itself, would strengthen the land force strength R. M. Miner-Larson.

Colonel, USA

d. IN Review, does vary little to Deputy Director William during the Fall of 1961. The British cannot be European Region and their position within the context of the above is not in the same way.

1 Enclosure
a/s

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Executive Order 11652

ESTIMATE OF EUROPEAN NATO BUILD-UP
OVER THE NEXT YEAR

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1. Assumption: That the East-West crisis especially as it relates to Berlin and Central Europe is not fed by new incidents and pressures on the part of the Soviets or East Germans for a period of one year.
2. Questions: How have our European NATO Allies responded to the Berlin crisis? What would be the effect on the force build-up of the NATO countries over the next year under the assumption outlined in paragraph 1 above?

a. General: Although there was considerable pressure in NATO for a short term build-up toward an anticipated crisis over Berlin, many of the actions taken under the stimulus of Secretary Rusk's presentation before the SAC on 8 August 1961 and the SACEUR "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" were actually long term and should have the effect of providing a higher plateau of forces. That is, some of the most dramatic actions taken were accelerations of actions that were about to be taken in any event. Consequently, the forces generated should not be affected by a leveling off of pressures over Berlin.

b. Germany: The Berlin crisis set in motion a series of actions by the FRG which should maintain momentum for at least one year. The Germans were able to commit their ninth division to SACEUR and organize the tenth, eleventh and twelfth with short term personnel actions such as administratively retaining personnel on active duty. If legal action is completed on raising the term of conscription from 12 to 18 months (now estimated to be passed by Bundestag by 1 April 1962), the higher force levels in the FRG should be maintained. This program is supported by agreement with the U.S. for common item logistics support. There is good reason to believe the Germans will maintain and improve their new force level.

c. France: The French took credit for responding to the Berlin crisis by returning two divisions to the continent from Algeria in the Fall of 1961. If the Algerian problem is settled in the coming year, the French will probably return two more divisions to the continent and have talked about returning full three divisions. Two to three additional French divisions on the continent, reorganized and in position to reinforce SACEUR, would strengthen the land force strength of SACEUR's forces.

d. UK: Having done very little toward the Berlin build-up during the Fall of 1961, the British cannot be expected to improve their position under conditions of the above assumption. In fact, there will most certainly be a slight reduction in the number of personnel in the BAOR over the next year even though the actual number of units is not reduced.

e. Netherlands: The Dutch responded to Berlin crisis by extending the conscription period 2 months, increasing the manning levels of NATO units and temporarily moving one light brigade to Germany. No change in the "crisis" atmosphere would probably result in a Dutch return to original

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status, especially if Germany and U.S. do not maintain their build-up of forces.

f. Belgium: M-Day divisions in Germany have been augmented but are still short by 3,000 enlisted personnel. Both Army and Air Force are short of technicians. Softening of the Berlin crisis and extensive negotiations would not tend to cause Belgium to ease back to previous manning levels to any great extent since the Belgian build-up was not primarily in response to the Berlin crisis.

g. Italy: Italy took some significant short term actions such as accelerated training and equipment procurement, but the effects are not expected to be long term.

h. Denmark: A reduction in level of the "crisis" would probably accelerate plans to reduce the current 16 month conscription period and allow manning levels to become even lower. Internal pressures for increased defense spending would probably suffer.

i. Norway: Although M-Day units had slight improvements in manning levels, no significant build-up was achieved. A leveling off of the "crisis" would probably result in gradual decline of manning levels and defense spending.

j. Greece: The strength of the Army was increased from 118,000 to 128,000; the manning levels of M-Day units were thereby raised to 76%. Training of non-organic support units has been intensified. The Greek military effort is almost entirely dependant upon external support.

k. Turkey: The manning level of M-Day divisions was raised to 91% (except for officers and NCO's) and 1st Echelon divisions from 45% to 81%. Shortages of regular personnel and skilled technicians remain an important weakness. Efforts to improve the Turkish military posture will require increased U.S. MAP support and grant aid.

l. Portugal and Luxembourg: The Berlin crisis has had no impact on these countries.

m. Summary: It is concluded that the units made available to SACEUR as a result of the Berlin crisis will be maintained. Except for Germany and France there may be a slight reduction in the manning over the period under the assumed conditions. Thus, to a total of 21 2/3 divisions (including U.S. and Canada) assigned to Central European Forces on 1 July 1961 there has already been added one German and two French divisions for a total of 24 1/3 divisions. This total could be increased to 30 divisions by the end of the year if France and Germany each add three more divisions.

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Question: On the basis of paragraph 2 above, how would NATO one year from now stand with respect to the Soviet Bloc, i.e., better off, worse off, or the same?

DATE:

- a. Within the framework of the current NATO strategic concept (i.e., no concept of limited war with the Soviets; use nuclear weapons at the outset except for local hostile actions, infiltrations and incursions) NATO will remain the same versus the Soviet Bloc in that the current nuclear superiority of the West will remain a deterrent on major Soviet moves.
- b. Within the framework of the strategic concept envisioned by the 21 April 1961 U.S. Policy Directive on NATO (i.e., halt Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked) there would be only a very slight achievement of NATO capability to carry out such a concept. Given the imbalance of non-nuclear forces which will exist a year from now, it is considered that the Soviets could rapidly effect a major penetration of the main NATO defenses and thus place NATO non-nuclear forces in a situation where they could no longer cope with the Soviet non-nuclear attack. The questions that must then be explored are: What would be the effect on Soviet forces deep in Germany of nuclear strikes on the USSR? Would the Soviets, despite mutual use of nuclear weapons, overrun Western Europe? If the answer to the latter question is negative, then the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc one year from now will have worsened.
- c. Within the framework of the mutual nuclear deterrent which will exist in 1966, a NATO increase to 30 divisions by the end of this year can be considered as insignificant. In order to escape the dilemma of 1966, NATO should achieve prior to that time a capability to meet any Soviet non-nuclear aggression with non-nuclear means. In this sense, time is running out and the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc one year from now will have greatly worsened.

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